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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade I (GATT) and the Law of
the Sea Convention 2 (LOS Convention) contain what are perhaps the most
comprehensive and complex dispute-resolution mechanisms of any such
agreements. Of greatest importance among these dispute-resolution mech-
anisms are the frameworks for arbitration provided in each agreement.
Together these two frameworks provide a paradigm for drafting arbitration
provisions in multilateral agreements.
Arbitration under the GATT and the LOS Convention is characterized
more by similarities than by differences. Not the least of these similarities
is each treaty's recognition that, in situations calling for nations to relin-
quish some measure of their sovereign rights, the most politically feasible
means of dispute resolution is often found in the establishment of arbitral
bodies. It becomes the task of treaty negotiators to draft provisions that:
(1) trigger arbitration, (2) govern how arbitration is to proceed (both the
LOS Convention and the GATT leave procedure largely to the arbitral
panel), and (3) provide some means of enforcing arbitral decisions. For
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
2. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.98/Rev.4 (1981). Between
December 6 and 10, 1982, 119 nations signed the LOS Convention. The United States has
not signed for reasons set out fully in Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea,
24 VA. J. INT'L L. 785 (1980); see also Ickle, Exchange between Expert Panel and Reagan
Administration Officials on Non-Sea Bed Mining Provisions of LOS Treaty, 79 AM. JUR.
INT'L L. 151 (1985).
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guidance on drafting these provisions, future negotiators would be well-
advised to study the provisions of the GATT and the LOS Convention.
A comparison of the two arbitration frameworks also suggests itself for
analytical reasons. Comparing the arbitration provisions of one treaty
with those of the other allows a thorough understanding of each respec-
tively. Issues not evident from studying the language of a single treaty
are suggested by the presence (or absence) of similar or dissimilar language
in the second.
The comparison is even more useful in light of the lengthy and intensely
political negotiating histories of the two treaties' dispute-resolution mech-
anisms. The dispute-resolution mechanisms of both treaties evolved in
multilateral negotiations involving global political pressures to encourage
relinquishment of some measure of state sovereignty for the common
good. 3 The LOS Convention attempts to foster global recognition of and
respect for the commonality of ocean resources. The GATT institution-
alizes a preference for unfettered trade on a most-favored-nation basis.
Both treaties attempt to cover their subject matter exhaustively, requiring
comprehensive dispute-resolution mechanisms. 4 Drafters of comprehen-
sive dispute-resolution mechanisms must remember that the extent to
which states are willing to relinquish their sovereign rights is dependent
upon their ability to influence the behavior of other states. 5 Negotiating
arbitration procedures in this context calls for balancing conflicting na-
tional and international goals in the manner of a diplomatic horsetrader.6
Finally, the force and effect of a treaty's arbitration procedure is only as
strong as the signatory governments' agreement as to what constitutes
correct government behavior.7
Section I of this article discusses the relevant treaty provisions and
describes the "functional" approach of the LOS convention and the "an-
3. As a matter of historical background, it is interesting to note that the negotiation of
the arbitration provisions of both treaties were conducted at approximately the same time.
While the GATT in chief was negotiated immediately after World War 11, its current arbi-
tration procedure was not negotiated until the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations
held from 1973 through 1979. The LOS Convention, including its arbitration provisions,
took form during plenary debates at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1975 through 1982.
4. Regarding the LOS Convention, "'The [dispute-resolution] provisions attempt to pro-
vide dispute-settlement mechanisms for all matters of contention arising out of the law of
the sea-boundary disputes, navigation and pollution issues, fishery matters ... and transfer
of technology problems, to name a few." See Gaertner, The Dispute Settlement Provisions
of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: Critique and Alternatives to the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 579-80 (1982).
5. See Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business,
13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 149-50 (1980).
6. Gaertner, supra note 4, at 578-79.
7. Hudec, supra note 5, at 150.
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tilegalist" approach of the GATT. Section II explores the requirements
of the two agreements for consultation prior to the initiation of arbitration
and how the failure to resolve a dispute by consultation triggers more
formal dispute-resolution mechanisms. Section III discusses the excep-
tions in the LOS Convention to compulsory arbitration, which arguably
undercut significantly the force of its arbitration provision. Section IV
addresses the scope of jurisdiction under the two conventions, i.e., the
kinds of actions or disputes that are "actionable." Section V analyzes the
question of applicable law; Section VI, the selection of a tribunal; Section




1. The LOS Convention
Part XV of the LOS Convention (Articles 279 through 299) contains
the Convention's dispute-resolution mechanism in chief. Part XV contains
three sections: Section 1 (Articles 279 through 285) contains various gen-
eral provisions and imposes upon all parties an obligation to resolve dis-
putes peaceably; Section 2 (Articles 286 through 296) provides several
forms of compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions; Section 3
(Articles 297 through 299) creates limitations on and exceptions to the
compulsory procedures in Section 2. Annex V to the LOS Convention,
"Conciliation," establishes conciliation procedures triggered by Articles
284, 297, and 298. Annex VII, "Arbitration," contains arbitration pro-
cedures. 8 Given the paucity of official records, the personal notes of one
participant in the negotiations (collected in a law review article) form the
most useful legislative history of the LOS Convention's dispute-resolution
provisions. 9
2. The GATT
Article XXII, "Conciliation," and Article XXIII, "Nullification or Im-
pairment," contain the principal dispute-resolution provisions of the
8. The focus of this article is arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. Other dispute
resolution procedures provided in the LOS Convention (not examined in this article) are:
special arbitration under Annex VIII, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
under Annex VI, and the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea under Section 4 of Annex VI.
9. Adede, Prolegomena to the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of the Sea Convention,
10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253, 253-54 (1977).
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GATT. 10 During the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the
GATT contracting parties adopted, in the form of a "decision," the "Un-
derstanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, and Dispute Settle-
ment"' l (Understanding) with an annex entitled "Agreed Description of
the Customs and Practice of the GATI in the Field of Dispute Settlement" 12
(Agreed Description). Collectively these are referred to as the "Article
XXIII documents." Each of the major non-tariff-barrier codes of conduct
negotiated during the Tokyo Round contains its own dispute-settlement
procedure, although those are not the focus of this article. 13
Since the 1979 Article XXIII documents were adopted, the number of
cases referred to the contracting parties for settlement has increased
sharply. 14 Arbitral panels' decisions in these cases are printed in the
GATT's Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD) series.15 As
evidenced by the number of law review articles he has published on the
topic, Professor J. H. Jackson is the recognized American authority in
the field of GATT dispute settlement.16
B. ANALYTICAL DICHOTOMIES
I. LOS Convention: "Functional" Versus "Comprehensive"
A dichotomy between "functional" and "comprehensive" approaches
to dispute resolution arises from an analysis of the arbitration provisions
that were proposed for inclusion in the LOS Convention but were rejected.
As explained by Mr. Adede:
The functional approach envisioned the establishment of special settlement
procedures which would produce binding decisions settling disputes arising out
10. "None of GATT's major participants have accepted the General Agreement as a
'definitive' obligation, and GATT adjudicatory bodies have usually avoided placing emphasis
on the obligatory quality of GATT rules generally." Hudec, supra note 5, at 150. For a
thorough discussion of the General Agreement's entry into force via the "Protocol of Pro-
visional Application of the General Agreement," see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 60-66 (1969).
11. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980)
[hereinafter BISD].
12. Id. at 215.
13. Hudec, supra note 5, at 148 n.4.
14. Id. at 182-83.
15. See, e.g., United States-Import of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, L/5333,
BISD, supra note II (29th Supp.) at 107 (1983). A list of all GATT panel decisions from
1969 through 1979 is contained in an appendix to Hudec, supra note 5.
16. See Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for the Settlement of Trade Disputes, 1987 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 144; Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC
Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978) [hereinafter Jackson, Jurisprudence]; Jackson,
Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT,
13 J.W.T.L. I (1979) [hereinafter Jackson, Governmental.
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of various parts of the Convention: Procedures would be established to settle
technical and scientific disputes arising from the fisheries, pollution, scientific
research and transfer of technology sections of the Convention. 17
The "comprehensive" approach, on the other hand, "contemplated the
establishment of a Law of the Sea Tribunal, resort to the International
Court of Justice, and the establishment of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal for
the judicial settlement of disputes arising from all parts of the Law of the
Sea Convention." 18 The ultimate compromise was "a system for peaceful
settlement of Law of the Sea disputes through procedures which [are]
flexible enough to allow states the choice of effective modes of settlement
ranging from the noncompulsory and nonjudicial procedures to the com-
pulsory judicial ones." 19
2. The GATT: "Legalist" Versus 'Antilegalist"
The fundamental tension underlying the negotiation of the 1979 GATT
Article XXIII documents arose between those favoring a "legalist" or
rule-oriented approach to dispute settlement and those favoring a politi-
cally sensitive or "antilegalist" approach. 20 Mr. R. E. Hudec distinguishes
the two approaches as follows:
A "legalist" viewpoint has supported the effort to write clearly defined rules
and has urged the importance of a third-party adjudication procedure that can
objectively apply such rules in disputed cases. An "antilegalist" viewpoint has
emphasized the complexity of the political, social, and economic forces involved
in any government's trade policy, as well as the limited power of international
legal obligations in the face of such forces. This latter view has admitted that
rules may have some value as guidelines, but has sought to discourage resort
to adjudication, favoring more loosely structured consultation procedures in
which governments seek to resolve conflicts through negotiation.21
A barrage of complaints by the United States during the Tokyo Round
was the primary impetus for placing the reform of GATT arbitration pro-
cedures on the agenda. 22 The United States' objective in adopting this
"shake it by the throat" reform strategy was to convince its fellow con-
tracting parties of the need to adopt a more legalistic framework. 23 Note-
17. Adede, supra note 9, at 261.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 277.
20. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 3-4. See also Professor Jackson's dispar-
agement of the GATT dispute-resolution mechanism as allowing settlement "by reference
to the relative economic or other power that the disputants possess." Id. at 8.
21. Hudec, supra note 5, at 151.
22. Id. at 155. Implementing the Article XXIII mechanism was not put on the agenda
until 1976, thirty years after the GATT was finalized. Id., at 157-58.
23. Hudec, supra note 5, at 155.
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worthy among the complaints lodged during the Tokyo Round was the
Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) case between the United
States and the European Economic Community (EEC) involving a dispute
over tax practices that allegedly constituted violations of the GATT's
prohibition on export subsidies.24
The most prominent proponent of legalist reform has been Professor
Jackson, who relates nearly all failures in the GATT dispute mechanism
to the "lack of an effective legal system for the rules concerned." 25 Pro-
fessor Jackson has enumerated a list of weaknesses in GATT dispute
resolution due to this antilegalist bias. 26 A short while before the con-
tracting parties adopted the Article XXIII documents, Professor Jackson
proposed a "Protocol for Resolution of Trade and Economic Disputes,"
which suggested a more rule-oriented approach. 27
Those who were hoping, as was Professor Jackson, that more legalist
reforms would come out of the Tokyo Round negotiations were disap-
pointed. The Article XXIII documents principally codified the arbitral
practice that had evolved over time with "selective adjustments designed
to enhance its efficiency and impact." 28 One writer has also observed
that:
Viewed from outside the GATT's historical and institutional context, the
Tokyo Round results will appear to be a rather timid response to the threat of
deteriorating international discipline. To the GATT insider, however, radical
24. Id. at 164. For a comprehensive treatment of the DISC case, see Jackson, Juris-
prudence, supra note 16.
25. Jackson, Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 749. For an impassioned plea by Professor
Jackson for a more legalist approach, see Panel, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Dispute
Settlement, 1980 AM. SocY' INT'L L. PROC. 129, 137.
26. Professor Jackson's list of weaknesses in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism
includes:
(i) The procedures for initiating a complaint process are ill defined, subject to delay and
arguably subject to "permission" of a political body through vote of the Contracting
Parties (which may in practice necessitate agreement of the disputants); (ii) The delay
plays into the hands of a "fait accompli" approach to trade policy. A nation will argue
that while its parliament or executive considers an action and before it is implemented,
it is premature for an international body or foreign government to investigate or intervene
. . ; (iii) Meager resources of personnel, staff and money may contribute to inadequate
consideration of the facts and arguments of particular cases; (iv) Fact finding resources
and procedures are inadequate; (v) There are inadequate procedures for reopening a
complex case when a panel seems to have made a mistake; (vi) The legal effect of
"findings" of a panel are ambiguous; (vii) Finally, the implementation phases of the
procedures are too loose, too ill defined, and ... involve political calculations and "trade
offs" that are inappropriate to an adjudicating type procedure that needs to develop
confidence and trust of future participants.
Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 7-8.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Hudec, supra note 5, at 158.
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reform was never a realistic possibility. The fundamental political constraints
that limit GATT regulatory policy had not changed. 29
II. Consultation
A. GENERAL OBLIGATION TO CONSULT
1. The LOS Convention
Both the LOS Convention and the GATT impose an obligation to ex-
haust informal and peaceful means of dispute settlement prior to triggering
the treaties' respective arbitration mechanisms. The LOS Convention
imposes a general obligation to settle any "dispute between them con-
cerning the interpretation or application" of the Convention in accordance
with the methods set out in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions. 30 Those methods include: "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, con-
ciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, or
other peaceful means." 31 The LOS Convention further encourages con-
ciliation between disputing parties by inviting dispute resolution "by any
peaceful means of their own choice." 32 Central to this obligation to settle
disputes peaceably under the LOS Convention is an obligation to exchange
views expeditiously. 33 Yet another peaceful dispute-resolution mechanism
exists in formal conciliation in accordance with Annex V to the
Convention. 34
Formal conciliation under Annex V is fairly rule-oriented and roughly
parallels the arbitration procedure provided in Annex VII to the Conven-
tion. Initiation of Annex V conciliation occurs only if both parties consent
to the procedure. 35 Each party selects two of the five conciliators, pref-
erably from a list maintained by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, and those four conciliators choose the fifth. 36 The conciliation
commission determines its own procedure and "make[s] proposals to the
parties with a view to reaching an amicable settlement." 37 Finally, the
conciliation commission issues a report recording "any agreements reached
and, failing agreement, its conclusions on all questions of fact or law
relevant to the matter in dispute and such recommendations as the com-
mission may deem appropriate." 38 The report is not binding on the parties
29. Id.
30. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 279.
31. U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. I.
32. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 280.
33. Id. art. 283.
34. Id. art. 285.
35. Id. Annex V, art. 1.
36. Id. arts. 3(b)-(d).
37. Id. arts. 4, 6.
38. Id. art. 7, para. 1.
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to the conciliation commission. 39 The conciliation is terminated "when a
settlement has been reached, when the parties have accepted or one party
has rejected the recommendations of the report . . . , or when a period
of three months has expired from the date of transmission of the report
to the parties." 40
2. The GATT
The GATT expresses the consultation obligation in somewhat different
terms. Article XXII of the GATT provides that each contracting party
shall "accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be
made by any other contracting party with respect to certain enumerated
obligations under the General Agreement, including all matters affecting
the operations of this Agreement" (emphasis added).
Article XXIII: I of the GATT provides that if a country should consider
that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement
is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
-the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement,
-the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
-the existence of any other situation
that country may "make written representations or proposals" to the
other contracting parties "which it considers to be concerned" and those
other countries shall give "sympathetic consideration" to such represen-
tations or proposals. 41 The nullification or impairment sections of the
GATT are discussed at greater length below.
The Understanding made the conciliatory resolution of disputes under
Articles XXII and XXIII:I more specific. In paragraph 4 of the Under-
standing the contracting parties "reaffirm their resolve" and "undertake
to respond to requests for consultations promptly and to attempt to con-
clude consultations expeditiously with a view to reaching mutually sat-
isfactory conclusions." In paragraph 5 the contracting parties agree to
accord special attention to the problems of less-developed countries that
arise in this regard. Finally, in paragraph 6 the contracting parties agree
to exhaust conciliatory methods under Article XXIII: I before resulting
to the panel procedure under Article XXIII:2. Nothing in the Understand-
ing provides for as formal a conciliation procedure as does Annex V to
the LOS Convention.
39. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
40. Id. art. 8.
41. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII: I (emphasis added).
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B. FAILURE TO RESOLVE BY CONSULTATION TRIGGERS
MORE FORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1. The GATT
If no "satisfactory adjustment" is reached within a "reasonable time"
under Articles XXII or XXIII: 1 of the GATT, the complaining party may
refer the matter to the contracting parties under Article XXIII:2. Para-
graph 8 of the Understanding provides that if a dispute is not resolved
through consultation, the dispute is to be referred to an "appropriate
body," which is to "use their good offices with a view to conciliation of
the outstanding differences between the parties." The "appropriate body"
that this paragraph refers to is the panel that can be established pursuant
to Article XXIII:2.
2. The LOS Convention
Similarly, failure to resolve a dispute by any of the available means
under section I of Part XV of the LOS Convention-including the means
provided in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and Annex V con-
ciliation-makes the disputing parties subject to the compulsory proce-
dure entailing binding decisions under section 2 of Part XV.4 2 The
Convention provides a choice of four compulsory procedures, summa-
rized as follows:
All contracting parties are covered by a compulsory procedure entailing bind-
ing decisions. If the parties to the dispute have accepted the same procedure,
they will submit to that procedure [art. 287, para. 4]. If the parties have not
chosen the same procedure, the dispute will go before an arbitral tribunal [art.
287, para. 5]. If any of the parties to the dispute has not chosen any procedure,
Part XV deems the parties to have accepted the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal
and the dispute is submitted thereto [art. 287, para. 3]. The parties to the dispute
may agree to present the dispute to a forum other than that specified in the
foregoing scheme [art. 287, paras. 3-5].IX.
4 3
III. LOS Convention Exceptions to Compulsory Arbitration
Section 3 of Part XV of the LOS Convention imposes limitations and
exceptions to the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions un-
der section 2 of that Part. As critiqued by Mr. Gaertner:
Section Three of Part XV delineates the limitations on and exceptions to the
compulsory dispute settlement provisions. The limitations on the compulsory
procedures exempt certain types of disputes that arise out of the coastal State's
discretionary exercise of sovereignty with respect to the uses of its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) [art. 297]. Similarly, the optional exceptions to the pro-
42. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 286.
43. Gaertner, supra note 4, at 583-84.
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cedures remove additional categories of disputes at the discretion of the State
party involved [art. 298]. These categories include: sea boundary delimitations
[art. 298, para. 1(a)], military activities and certain law enforcement measures
connected with the exercise of sovereignty within the coastal States' EEZ [art.
298, para. l(b)], and disputes over which the Security Council of the United
Nations has exercised jurisdiction [art. 298 para. I(c)]. 44
These limitations on and exceptions to compulsory dispute resolution
were intended to protect coastal states "from constant harassment by
international proceedings arising from the exercise of their discretionary
rights within the economic zone under the convention." 45 Section 3 is in
keeping with the functional approach taken throughout Part XV of the
LOS Convention.
The Section 3 exceptions and limitations have been criticized as ex-
cluding from the dispute-resolution mechanism the very matters that are
most contentious and most in need of a routine for settlement. According
to Mr. Gaertner:
These limitations and optional exceptions reduce the practical effects of the
Convention because those categories which are or may be excluded .. .are
the most likely to lead to dispute. The Convention apparently leaves these
matters to the traditional means of dispute settlement. Moreover ... the com-
pulsory procedures are only applicable once the means chosen by the parties
to the dispute fail. Thus parties are likely to continue to employ traditional
methods of dispute settlement extensively.46
Despite this criticism, it is unlikely that a major deviation from this func-
tional approach would elicit the approval of the participating states.47
44. Id. at 584-85.
45. Adede, supra note 9, at 262. For an earlier version of Article 297 see id. at 341; for
an earlier version of Article 298, see id. at 344. The protection afforded less-developed
countries has been criticized as unfair.
The Convention's dispute settlement mechanism is not a fair and equitable resolution to
the problem of dispute settlement. The provisions reflect an inequitable bias in favor of
the Group of 77 (G-77) and their goals under the New International Economic Order. The
limitations and exceptions to the compulsory dispute settlement provisions show the
influence of the G-77. Through the use of these provisions, the coastal State members of
the G-77 can exercise a great deal of discretionary power concerning the uses of EEZs
without having to submit any dispute to a procedure which would entail a binding decision
(citations omitted).
Gaertner, supra note 4, at 586.
46. Gaertner, supra note 4, at 592.
47. Id. at 594. "The political feasibility ... of eliminating these limitations completely
is doubtful. The negotiations on the Convention dispute settlement provisions indicate the
sensitivity of coastal States with respect to their exercise of sovereignty in the EEZ." Id.
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IV. Scope of Jurisdiction
A. THE GATT
The "triggering criterion" for jurisdiction under the GATT is "nullifi-
cation or impairment" of "any benefit accruing" to a country "directly
or indirectly" under the GATT.48 Simply stated:
If any contracting party believes a benefit it should get under the GATT has
been "nullified or impaired" as a result of another contracting party's breach
or other measure, then it may seek consultation and if that fails, the complainant
may ask the plenary GATT body to authorize (by majority vote) suspension of
GATT obligations (a sort of "retaliation") as a response. 49
A breach of obligations under the GATT by one contracting party without
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to a second contracting
party is an insufficient basis for invoking a GATT arbitral panel's juris-
diction, but nullification or impairment of a benefit-even if no breach of
a GATT obligation has occurred-is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 50
Nullification or impairment results "when the 'reasonable expectations'
of a GATT party as to its trade opportunities that should arise as a result
of tariff negotiations (and possibly other GATT measures) are disap-
pointed." 51 Professor Jackson likens the concept to the "injury" require-
ment for standing to sue in American jurisprudence as well as to concepts
of "harm" and "damage." 52 Professor Jackson complains that the con-
cept is "vague" and "ambiguous." 53 In certain situations it is "presumed
* . . that nullification or impairment is present, unless the defendant nation
carried a burden of proof to show that there had been no nullification or
impairment (i.e., shows that there had been no 'injury')." 54 This is similar
to the concept of a rebuttable presumption in American jurisprudence. A
rebuttable presumption of nullification or impairment arises in situations
in which there has been
(i) a breach of the GATT legal obligation;
(ii) the establishment of a quantitative restriction on imports; or
(iii) establishing a new subsidy for domestic production of a product for which a
previous GATT tariff "binding" was undertaken. 5
5
48. Jackson, Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 754.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 755; Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 6.
52. Jackson, Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 755; see also Jackson, Governmental, supra
note 16, at 6.
53. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 5 & 7.
54. Jackson, Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 755.
55. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 6.
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B. THE LOS CONVENTION
In marked contrast with the GATT's criteria of nullification or impair-
ment, the LOS Convention confers jurisdiction over "any dispute con-
cerning the interpretation or application of this Convention" on Article
287 tribunals. 56 The LOS Convention further expands the jurisdiction of
arbitral tribunals to "any dispute concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of an international agreement related to the purposes of this Con-
vention." 57 These provisions are not unlike standard commercial contract
clauses to submit disputes arising out of or related to the contract to an
institutional arbitral tribunal. 58 This jurisdictional clause is a simplification
of clauses considered earlier in the negotiations. 59
While the GATT incorporates what appears to be an ambiguous (per-
haps even slippery) jurisdictional provision in the concept of nullification
or impairment, and the LOS Convention appears to adopt a more straight-
forward approach, obtaining jurisdiction of a GATT arbitral tribunal may
in practice be easier. To confer jurisdiction on a GATT arbitral panel, one
need only identify a right conferred by the GATT that is affected by the
actions of another country. For a LOS Convention arbitral panel to ex-
ercise jurisdiction: (1) a dispute under the Convention must be present,
(2) the parties to, the dispute must have consented or be deemed to have
consented by application of the Montreux formula,60 and (3) the dispute
must not be one to which an exception under section 3 of Part XV applies.
V. Applicable Law
A. THE LOS CONVENTION
Both the GATT and the LOS Convention manifest an intention to re-
solve disputes by applying a body of international law that is largely self-
contained within the respective treaties. Unlike the GATT, the LOS Con-
vention expressly provides for the law applicable to disputes arbitrated
thereunder. In fact, regardless of which of the four fora exercises juris-
diction over the LOS dispute (whether the ICJ, the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, a regional organization, or an Annex VII arbitral
tribunal), the applicable law remains the same. Article 293 of the LOS
Convention provides:
56. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 288, para. 1.
57. Id. art. 288, para 2. Which international agreements are intended to be included in
this language is not immediately apparent.
58. The American Arbitration Association standard clause reads in part: "Any contro-
versy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration ......
59. Adede, supra note 9, at 292-93.
60. For a discussion of the Montreux formula, see section VI.A. infra.
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I. A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this
Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this
Convention.
2. Paragraph I does not prejudice the power of the court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under this section to decide a case ex aqueo et bono, if the
parties so agree. 6 1
An earlier negotiating draft of this section provided that the court or
tribunal with jurisdiction
(1) shall apply the law of the present Convention, other rules of international
law, and any other applicable law; and
(2) shall ensure that the rule of law is observed in the interpretation and ap-
plication of the present Convention.
(3) The provisions of this Chapter shall not prejudice the right of the parties
to the dispute to agree that the dispute be decided ex aqueo et bono.
6 2
Two differences between the negotiating draft and the final version are
noteworthy. First, the deletion of the language "other rules of interna-
tional law, and any other applicable law" and its replacement with "other
rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention" suggests
that the Convention is meant to be a comprehensive statement of the
international law of the sea. Second, the agreed-upon language alters the
right to decide the dispute ex aqueo et bono from being one of the parties'
to being at the discretion of the tribunal. The language in paragraph 2 of
Article 293 is similar to the formula used by the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
63
B. THE GATT
Neither Article XXIII of the GATT itself nor the Article XXIII docu-
ments adopted in 1979 contain a clause providing for the application of a
certain body of law to dispute-resolution under the GATT. The triggering
criteria of Article XXIII: 1, however, make clear that it is the obligations
imposed by the GATT that are to govern dispute resolution. Paragraph 3
of the Agreed Description provides that the functions of arbitral panels
are "to review the facts of a case and the applicability of GATT provisions
and to arrive at an objective assessment of" the dispute.
Other than these two implied references to GATT principles, the GATT
dispute-resolution mechanism does not stipulate what law is to be applied.
Perhaps the implication to be reached from this omission is that the gov-
erning law in all disputes is to be solely GATT legal principles. This
61. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
62. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Rev.1, Part IV, reprinted in 5 THIRD UNCLOS OFF.
REC. 190 (emphasis added).
63. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mar. 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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conclusion is further substantiated by the standard "terms of reference"
assigned by the contracting parties to Article XXIII:2 panels, which read
in part "examine, in light of relevant GATT provisions." 64 Professor
Jackson, however, has found an "implied invitation to act 'ex aqueo et
bono' or in an equitable as opposed to a 'legal rule application' manner." 65
VI. Tribunal Selection
A. LOS CONVENTION MONTREUX FORMULA
The method for selecting a tribunal represents the central compromise
between the functional and comprehensive approaches to dispute reso-
lution under the LOS Convention. The compromise in Article 287, which
is referred to as the Montreux formula, provides parties with a choice of
tribunals as well as a set of rules to be applied in situations in which
parties have not selected a tribunal or have made conflicting selections. 66
The Montreux formula "represents virtually an absolute compromise,
giving states a choice of all the various forums. . . . The flexibility therein
maintained is intended to lead to a wider acceptance of the system as a
whole." 67 The Montreux formula incorporates a preference for arbitration
over alternate dispute-resolution methods. First, parties may choose ar-
bitration themselves. 68 Second, if a party to a dispute has failed to declare
a choice of tribunal, that party is deemed to have consented to Annex
VII arbitration. 69 Third, if the parties to the dispute have made declara-
tions in favor of different tribunals and cannot otherwise agree, they are
also deemed to have consented to Annex VII arbitration. 70
At various junctures in the negotiations, the LOS Convention drafters
considered alternatives to the Montreux formula's preference for arbitra-
tion. One early proposal vested comprehensive jurisdiction over disputes
arising under the LOS Convention in the newly created International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (International Tribunal). 7 1 This proposal
provided that each signatory automatically consented to the jurisdiction
of the International Tribunal, placing the onus on signatories to "contract
out of" the International Tribunal. 72 Participants in plenary debates re-
64. See, e.g., BISD, supra note II, (29th Supp.) at 107; United States-Prohibition of
Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, Id. at 91-92.
65. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 7.
66. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
67. Adede, supra note 9, at 385.
68. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 287, para. l(c).
69. Id. para. 3.
70. Id. para. 5. An earlier version of this provision is found in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.9/Rev.2, reprinted in 6 THIRD UNCLOS OFF. REC. 144, 146.
71. Adede, supra note 9, at 259.
72. See Annex VII to the LOS Convention, supra note 2.
VOL. 21, NO. 4
GATT & LOS: ARBITRATION PROVISIONS COMPARISON 1003
jected this presumption of consent to the jurisdiction of the International
Tribunal in favor of the more functional Montreux formula. 73 The delegate
from the People's Republic of China best articulated the participants'
preference for this functional approach: "[T]he question of the settlement
involves the sovereignty of all states, the procedures to be followed must
be chosen by the states themselves." 7
4
Another proposed alternative to the Montreux formula was to name
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the sole tribunal for dispute res-
olution. This alternative would offer several advantages.
The institution is already well-established, and no expense would be involved
in setting up the necessary machinery. Also, the ICJ already has an established
procedure with which the international legal community is familiar. If the parties
are willing to submit their dispute to an international forum, they are more
likely to use the ICJ than a forum with which they have less experience. The
ICJ has had some experience in the law of the sea. This, in conjunction with
the fact that the ICJ would be the sole adjudicatory forum, would avoid the
undesirable effects of a multiplicity of fora. 75
Vesting sole jurisdiction in the ICJ suffered the same practical shortcoming
as did vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea-the participating states expressed their preference for a
functional approach rather than this decidedly comprehensive approach.
In addition, since it is open only to states, the ICJ would be an inadequate
tribunal for LOS Convention dispute resolution, as nonstates would be
disputants in LOS Convention disputes.
[P]otential parties to Law of the Sea disputes would be states, an international
organization, and individuals conducting mining activities in the international
sea-bed area. Accordingly, the International Court of Justice, the jurisdiction
of which is open only to states (and is also not widely accepted by a large
number of states), would be inadequate. 76
B. GATT PANEL PROCEDURE
The GATT itself is silent on the matter of selecting arbitral tribunals.
Nothing in Article XXIII of the GATT provides for the establishment of
arbitral panels nor for the arbitral procedure that is the hallmark of GATT
dispute resolution. Article XXII:2 provides only that the complaining
contracting party may refer the dispute to the contracting parties who
"shall promptly investigate [and] make appropriate recommendations." 77
73. Adede, supra note 9, at 272.
74. Statement of the Representation of the People's Republic of China, 5 THiRD UNCLOS
OFF. REC. 44.
75. Gaertner, supra note 4, at 594.
76. Adede, supra note 9, at 258.
77. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXII:2.
FALL 1987
1004 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
GATT arbitral panels developed over time in response to need. "Part of
the Article XXIII process has been a tradition of appointing 'panels' of
persons who are not citizens of either of the disputing parties to 'hear
the case' as presented by the disputing parties, and come to some
conclusion.' '78
In 1979 the GATT contracting parties agreed, in the Understanding, 79
that the customary practice of establishing arbitral panels should con-
tinue.80 The Understanding specifically provides that the party invoking
Article XXIII:2 has the right to request the "establishment of a panel to
assist the C[ontracting] Pjarties] to deal with the matter." 81 In addition,
"the mere existence of the Article XXIII documents adds to the legitimacy
of the panel procedure" 82 and affirms the panel's adjudicatory role; more-
over, the Article XXIII documents provide the panel with the "authority
of long-established practice." 83
To some extent the Article XXIII documents-purporting to set out
"customary practice"-are an "artful revision of GATT history." 84 The
Article XXIII documents accurately portray only the GATT practice for
the years during the Tokyo Round multilateral negotiations, 85 and "whether
or not they accurately portray the past, they do make it clear that panels
are to play this mediatory role in the future." 86 The decision to codify
"customary" panel practice was made despite pressures to adopt an ap-
proach similar to that which had developed for the purpose of settling
disputes under the GATT Codes of Conduct 87 or to adopt a more rule-
oriented arbitration procedure. 88
Despite the adoption of the Article XXIII documents in 1979, certain
procedural uncertainties remain in GATT arbitral procedure. First, the
Understanding and Agreed Description do not mandate the establishment
78. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 6.
79. BISD, supra note 11.
80. Id. pa'ra. 7.
81. Id. para. 10.
82. Hudec, supra note 5, at 177.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 186.
85. The active mediatory role of arbitral panels was not a longstanding GATT "custom."
Rather, it developed during the Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations in response to
a barrage of requests by the United States in an attempt to obtain reform of the GATT
dispute settlement procedure. See Panel, supra note 25, at 133; see also Jackson, Govern-
mental, supra note 16, at 6.
86. Hudec, supra note 5, at 187.
87. For a dispute-settlement procedure, see discussion of "surveillance bodies" as an
alternative in Hudec, supra note 5, at 168-70.
88. For Professor Jackson's recommendation that an "impartial third party panel of
arbitration [be established to] . . . pursue a restrictive method of interpretation and appli-
cation of agreed rules, rather than an 'expansive' method," see Jackson, Governmental,
supra note 16, at 10.
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of an arbitral panel after a certain period of consultation has elapsed as,
for example, the GATT Code of Conduct governing subsidies does. 89
Second, the Understanding and Agreed Description do not explicitly state
that the contracting parties must always grant requests for the establish-
ment of arbitral panels nor do they provide standards for granting or
denying such requests. 90 Third, the Article XXIII documents do not "ad-
dress the issue of the need for a second Council decision confirming the




While the GATT provides for explicit sanctions for violations of its
terms, such sanctions are rarely invoked. In its artful revision of the
custonary GATT practice, the 1979 Article XXIII documents incorporate
a preference for mediation in every step of the dispute-resolution pro-
ceedings and provide that imposition of sanctions are the "last resort."
Ironically, the LOS Convention-despite the desire of some participants
in its drafting to create a comprehensive dispute-resolution scheme--does
not provide for any specific sanctions.
1. The GATT
The GATT contains language authorizing potentially severe sanctions
that are available as remedies under Article XXIII. It also provides the
contracting parties with the power to "authorize a contracting party to
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such
obligations or concessions under this Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances." 92 Suspending the application of obli-
gations or concessions under the GATT means, essentially, imposing
otherwise prohibited trade practices upon the violating country. 93 Despite
this explicit grant of power, "[t]he GATT regulatory structure has never
been very coercive. Technically, the GATT authorizes the use of economic
countermeasures that could serve as coercive sanctions, but the GATT
has chosen not to make use of this opportunity."' 94 In fact, the negotiating
history of the suspension power indicates that it was meant to be purely
89. See Subsidies Code, art. 18(1), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 288.
90. Hudec, supra note 5, at 176.
91. Id.
92. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:2 (emphasis added).
93. Hudec, supra note 5, at 150 n.6.
94. Id. at 150.
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compensatory and not punitive. 95 A 1979 survey indicated that only one
case culminated in suspended obligations.96
The Article XXIII documents emphasize that the most satisfactory
"remedy" is voluntary settlement. Given this preference, the Article
XXIII documents provide "a more active mediatory role [for the panels]
during the adjudication proceedings, in an effort to create additional pres-
sures for voluntary settlement." 97 In order to obtain the "remedy" of
voluntary settlement, panels are to "consult regularly with the parties to
the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually
satisfactory solution." 98
GATT arbitral panels are to secure a "positive solution," 99 and the
Article XXIII documents set forth a hierarchy of permissible remedies
toward achieving that end:
[1] a solution mutually acceptable to the parties is clearly to be preferred;
[2] the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be incon-
sistent with the GATT; [3] the provision of compensation should be resorted
to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a
temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which are incon-
sistent with the provisions of the GATT; and [4] the last resort is the possibility
of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations on a discrim-
inatory basis vis-A-vis the other contracting party, .... an action which has only
rarely been contemplated [under this hierarchy]. 100
The role of the arbitral panel in mediation to achieve the remedy of
voluntary settlement is another example of the antilegalist bent of the
GATT's dispute-resolution process. This role also places arbitral panels
in a "troublesome" dual role as both an adjudicatory (rule-oriented) and
political arbiter. 101
2. The LOS Convention
Nothing in the LOS Convention sets out a preferred hierarchy of rem-
edies for resolving disputes submitted to arbitration. Whether awards are
to be merely compensatory or punitive as well is uncertain. Annex VII
95. Id. at 150 n.6.
96. The only case in GATT which proceeded all the way to the application of"sanctions"
or suspended obligations by complaining party because of an infringement or nullification
and impairment of another, was that in which the Netherlands was authorized to depart
from its GATT obligations so as to limit the amount of imports of.wheat from the United
States, in response to the United States' quotas placed on dairy products. For several
years the Netherlands applied this quota on wheat, but it seemed to have no effect on
United States action mandated by Congress, concerning dairy products.
Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 5 n.13.
97. Hudec, supra note 5, at 185.
98. BISD, supra note 1H, para. 16.
99. Agreed Description, supra note 12, para. 4.
100. Id.
101. Hudec, supra note 5, at 187.
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provides the only guidance in stating that awards are to be "confined to
the subject matter of the dispute." 10 2 In itself, this language provides little
guidance.
B. BINDING FORCE OF DECISIONS
1. The GATT
Nothing in the GATT or related documents governs the finality, ap-
pealability, or binding force of final decisions. Panel findings themselves
are not self-enforcing and serve merely to "assist" the contracting parties
in making "objective assessment[s]"' 10 3 so as to enable the contracting
parties to reach their ultimate decision. The binding force of decisions
rendered through arbitration arises from the contracting parties' implicit
agreement to be held bound. In the Understanding, the contracting parties
expressly recognized "that the efficient functioning of the system depends
on their will to abide by the present understanding." 104
2. The LOS Convention
The LOS Convention, in comparison, is explicit on the binding effect
of arbitral decisions. "Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal under
this section [section 2 of Part XV] shall be final and shall be complied
with by all the parties to the dispute." 105 The binding force of an arbitral
decision is, however, limited to the parties to the dispute. 106 For disputes
submitted to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, the LOS Con-
vention also provides that the arbitral panel's award will be "final and
without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance
to an appellate procedure." 107 An earlier version of this provision ex-




The GATT Article XXIII documents contain provisions regarding en-
forceability of arbitral decisions that are in the nature of ongoing sur-
102. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 10.
103. BISD, supra note 11, para. 16.
104. Id. para. 7.
105. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 296, para. 1.
106. Id. art. 296, para. 2.
107. Id. Annex VII, art. 11.
108. The rejected language provided that "the award shall be final and without appeal.
The parties to the dispute shall immediately comply with the award." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.9/ Rev. 1, reprinted in 5 THIRD UNCLOS OFF. REC. 193.
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veillance of the decisions. As previously discussed, the contracting parties
have broad sanction powers and can permit one contracting party to
impose otherwise prohibited trading practices against another who vio-
lates the terms of the GATT.109 The Understanding provides that the
contracting parties "shall keep under surveillance any matter on which
they have made recommendations or given rulings.""1l 0 If the decision
that results from arbitration is not implemented, the party that originally
brought the complaint "may ask the C[ontracting] P[arties] to make suit-
able efforts with a view to finding an appropriate solution."'l
2. The LOS Convention
The LOS Convention's enforceability provision is more standard than
the GATT's surveillance provision. The LOS Convention does not ex-
pressly provide for continued surveillance of previously issued decisions,
as does the GATT, but the language in the LOS Convention pertaining to
"disputes as regards the ... manner of implementation of the award"'' 2
might be cited by a diligent complaining party to pressure the participants
into exercising such a function. The LOS Convention provides that:
I. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as
regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the award may be
submitted by either party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which made
the award....
2. Any such controversy may be submitted to another court or tribunal under
Article 287 by agreement of all the parties to the dispute.'' 3
This language does not provide for enforcement of arbitral decisions in
national courts, but does provide for enforcement by both the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the ICJ. The LOS Convention
does not have an enforcement mechanism similar to that in the U.N.
Charter that allows the Security Council to enforce ICJ decisions."l 4
VIII. Arbitration Procedure
A. INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS
I. The GATT
The GATT and the Article XXIII documents provide only the barest
indication of how an aggrieved contracting party is to initiate an arbitral
109. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
110. BISD, supra note II, at para. 22.
IM1. Id.
112. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 12, para. 1.
113. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex V1H, art. 12.
114. Gaertner, supra note 4, at 594.
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proceeding. A contracting party who has not received satisfaction in con-
ciliatory proceedings "within a reasonable time" may refer the dispute
to the contracting parties."15 As discussed above, a complaining party
has no right to have an arbitral panel established to settle a dispute. Rather,
the decision to establish a panel is left to the contracting parties' discre-
tion. Paragraph 4 of the Agreed Description makes clear that the estab-
lishment of an arbitral panel is a weighty matter. 116 One commentator has
noted that the threshhold necessary to establish a panel has been raised. 117
Failure to agree to a procedure for more methodical establishment of
arbitral panels has resulted in practical confusion. 118 First, "defendant"
governments are able to obstruct or delay the establishment of an arbitral
panel by claiming that the parties have not explored the disputed matter
sufficiently in bilateral consultations. 119 An obvious solution to these dila-
tory tactics would be to impose time limits for consultation in the Article
XXIII documents, a step the parties did not take.120 Second, ambiguous
language in the Agreed Description has provided the defendant govern-
ment with an opportunity to respond to the complaint before the Council,
"suggesting that there may be some point in debating the request for a
panel at [the] Council meeting."'12 1 Indeed, the EEC protested the for-
mation of an arbitral panel to investigate the U.S. complaint in the DISC
case. 
122
2. The LOS Convention
In contrast to the GATT's uncertainty, initiation of arbitration under
the LOS Convention is rather straightforward. The LOS Convention pro-
vides simply that:
[Alny party to a dispute may submit the dispute to the arbitral procedure
provided for in this Annex by written notification addressed to the other party
115. GATT, supra note I, art. XXIII:2. See also Agreed Description, supra note 12, para.
1, which reiterates the Article XXIII language.
116. Note especially the language providing that "[blefore bringing a case, contracting
parties have exercised their judgment as to whether action under Article XXIII:2 would be
fruitful." Agreed Description, supra note 12, para. 4 (emphasis added). The phrase "bringing
a case" departs from the otherwise antilegalist bent of the panel procedure.
117. Hudec, supra note 5, at 178.
118. While the failure to adopt set criteria for establishing an arbitral panel may have
resulted in confusion, the failure was not unintentional. The reluctance to establish a routine
procedure for formation of arbitral panels is in keeping with the GATT's antilegalist frame-
work and further evidences a presumption in favor of settlement and consultation as opposed
to formalized dispute resolution.
119. Hudec, supra note 5, at 171-72.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 175. "However, the Council has taken such decisions only after the party
concerned has had an occasion to study the complaint and prepare its response before the
Council." Agreed Description, supra note 12, para. 6 (ii).
122. Hudec, supra note 5, at 175, n.88.
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or parties to the dispute. The notification shall be accompanied by a statement
of the claim and the grounds on which it is based. 1
23
Constitution of an LOS Convention arbitral tribunal is not a matter of
discretion for the other signatory countries, as it is under GATT practice.
B. SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS
1. Lists of Arbitrators
a. The LOS Convention
Both the LOS Convention and the GATT provide for the compilation
of lists of qualified arbitrators. The LOS Convention permits each par-
ticipating state to "nominate four arbitrators, each of whom shall be a
person experienced in maritime affairs and enjoying the highest reputation
for fairness, competence, and integrity." 124 The Secretary-General of the
U.N. maintains this list. 125 While some proposed that arbitrators be re-
quired to be not only experienced in maritime affairs but also expert in
law of the sea matters, this proposal was rejected. Problems of interpre-
tation of the LOS Convention need not be referred to experts on the law
of the sea. 126
b. The GATT
The Director-General maintains lists of GATT arbitrators who are to
be "governmental and nongovernmental persons qualified in the fields of
trade relations, economic development, and other matters covered by the
GATT."1 27 Each contracting party has the opportunity to nominate "two
persons who would be available for such work."' 128 Professor Jackson
proposed that the 1979 Article XXIII documents impose additional qual-
ifications on the arbitrators, i.e., that the arbitrators listed "have ajudicial
temperament and reputation, meaning that his judgments and opinions
are considered fair and objective." 129 Professor Jackson's proposal par-
allels the language in the LOS Convention noted above, but the contracting
parties have not adopted it.
123. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 1.
124. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
125. Id.
126. Hudec, supra note 5, at 154.
127. BISD, supra note 11, para. 13.
128. Id.
129. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 18. Despite his influence in the field and
his reliance on the 1CJ Charter for his proposal, Professor Jackson's proposal was not
incorporated in the Article XXIII documents.
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2. Appointment and Number
a. The LOS Convention
Appointment of arbitrators under the GATT and LOS Convention is
not similar. Under the LOS Convention, each disputing party-in a man-
ner similar to that used in commercial arbitral tribunals-nominates one
arbitrator who together select by agreement three arbitrators from the list
of arbitrators maintained by the Secretary-General. 130 In all cases, the
number of arbitrators is to be five. 131
b. The GATT
GATT arbitral tribunals, on the other hand, are established by the
Director-General's proposing the composition of the panel "of three or
five members depending on the case." 132 The parties to the dispute are
obliged to "respond within a short period of time, i.e., seven working
days, to nominations of panel members by the Director-General and...
not [to] oppose nominations except for compelling reasons." 133 In prac-
tice, "it has been very hard to find qualified persons to serve on the panel
who are not in one form or another 'allied' to one of the disputants." 134
This problem is, no doubt, compounded by the express preference for
governmental representatives as panel members. 135 However, panel mem-
bers "serve in their individual capacities and not as governmental rep-
resentatives" and are not to be influenced by their governments. 136
C. TRIBUNAL'S DETERMINATION OF PROCEDURE
1. The LOS Convention
Both the GATT and the LOS Convention vest the responsibility for
determination of procedure in the duly constituted arbitral tribunal. The
LOS Convention provides that "[u]nless the parties to the dispute other-
wise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure, as-
suring to each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its
case."1
37
130. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 3, paras. (a)-(d).
131. Id.
132. BISD, supra note I1, para. I1.
133. Id. para. 12.
134. Jackson, Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 757.
135. BISD, supra note 11, para. 11.
136. Id. para. 14.
137. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 4.
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2. The GATT
GATT arbitral tribunals also decide upon their own working proce-
dures. 138 The Agreed Description provides that: (1) the disputing parties
can present their views both in writing and orally in the presence of each
other; (2) panel members may question both parties on any matter relevant
to the dispute; (3) the panel members are to hold memoranda so designated
as confidential; and (4) panel members may consult with contracting parties
not directly party to the dispute as well as with other technical experts. 139
Professor Jackson has suggested'that the arbitrators listed by the
Director-General promulgate rules of arbitration procedure in the form of
regulations, though such a step has not yet been taken.140
Parties involved in GATT arbitration are admonished that "the use of the
dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII:2 should not be intended or
considered as contentious acts."' 141 This statement was, in part, intended
as a chastisement of "defendant governments that treated a complaint as a
diplomatic insult in order to justify angry and punitive responses." 142
IX. Conclusion
It is to some degree ironic that GATT arbitration procedure, which
emerged from the simple language in Article XXIII, evolved into the
comprehensive system that in part surpasses the LOS Convention's ar-
bitration procedures. Perhaps this evolution is simply a consequence of
necessity. GATT arbitral practice developed as a response to growing
pressures for a comprehensive system for coping with international trade
disputes.
Over the course of negotiations, the arbitration provisions of the LOS
Convention changed from absolutely comprehensive to very functional.
From the initial proposals that all disputes be submitted to the newly
created International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the delegates to
the UNCLOS ultimately agreed upon the Montreux formula with its bias
in favor of more functional arbitral panels. The delegates then carved out,
in section 3 of Part XV of the LOS Convention, a host of exceptions to
the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, which removed
from the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals the most controversial disputes
that are likely to arise in the law of the sea. The evolution of the arbitration
procedures under both treaties can probably best be understood in light
of the intensely political negotiations from which they arose.
138. Agreed Description, supra note 12, para. 6 (iv).
139. Id.
140. Jackson, Governmental, supra note 16, at 20.
141. BISD, supra note I1, para. 9.
142. Hudec, supra note 5, at 178.
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